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JUDICIAL VALOUR AND THE WARREN COURT'S 
LABOR DECISIONS 
Theodore]. St. Antoine• 
LAWYERS who practice regularly before the Supreme Court are likely to prepare their arguments with a specific Justice in 
mind. The choice does not necessarily tum on who might be the 
swing vote in a given case. Often it is just a matter of which Justice 
can be relied upon, because of his particular interests and his in-
sight, to search out the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing 
positions, and to see that all the hard questions are asked. In a labor 
case during the early years of the Warren Court, that would usually 
have meant Justice Frankfurter. Later on, depending on the circum-
stances, it might have been Justice Harlan or Brennan or Fortas. 
It has probably never been the Chief Justice. 
Yet now as I look back upon the whole sweep of the Warren 
Court•s labor decisions over the past decade and a half, I am struck 
by the sudden suspicion that many members of the Supreme Court•s 
labor bar1 may have outsmarted themselves. They were, perhaps, 
like the fabled fox who knew many things; they failed to recognize 
that it was the Chief Justice who knew the One Big Thing. For the 
major contribution of the Warren Court to the development of 
labor law has not depended on the kind of subtle statutory inter-
pretation that is needed to wend one•s way through the labyrinthine 
secondary boycott passages of the Taft-Hartley Act. Instead, the 
Court•s main achievement in the labor field involved a simple but 
fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relations. What the 
Court did, in a series of decisions that were hotly controverted at 
the time but have quietly won general acceptance since, was to 
nationalize the regulation of labor relations in industries affecting 
interstate commerce. The Court's action reflected the same charac-
teristically audacious Warren appToach toward established state in-
stitutions which was displayed in dealing with reapportionment and 
civil rights. 
The importance in the Court's eyes of "federal pre-emption" -
the exclusion of state substantive law from areas regulated by Con-
gress-can be shown to an extent simply in quantitative terms. Some-
• Aaociate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1951, Fordham College: 
J.D. 1954, University of Michigail.-Ed. 
1. In fairness I should mention that I was a junior member of thh group (u 
union counael) for about half the span of the Warren Court. No one could be more 
guilty than I of the aa:usation in the text. 
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what arbitrarily, I have labelled about 110 labor decisions of the 
Warren era as "important." Of these, almost forty-or over a third 
-deal either directly with the metes and bounds of the pre-emption 
doctrine, or with issues which would not have arisen but for the 
displacement of state law by federal/o1 I shall discuss the cases in two 
categories: those decisions concerned with the extent to which state 
law may still operate in areas subject to federal regulation; and 
those decisions concerned with the development of federal law to 
replace state law as the basis for enforcing collective bargaining 
agreements. Thereafter, I shall add a few words about some of the 
other significant labor decisions of the Warren Court. 
At the time Chief Justice Warren assumed office, the pre-emption 
doctrine in its application to labor relations was still in its adoles-
cence. The well-nigh axiomatic principle had been established that 
a state could not directly impede the exercise of federal rights of 
self-organization, for example, by imposing onerous licensing re-
quirements on union agents. 8 But states were still &ee to regulate 
such labor activities as .. quickie" strikes, which technically were 
neither protected nor prohibited under federal law.' More impor-
tant, no clear rationale had been evolved to justify conclusions· that 
particular kinds of conduct fell either within or without the ambit 
of state regulation. And there had been little airing of the under-
lying policy considerations which go to tl)e. very heart of our federal 
system: the balancing of the need for a uniform national policy in 
matters affecting the country as a whole against the need to accom-
modate regional differences and desires for local experimentation. 
The first term of the Warren Court ushered in the vanguard 
elements of today's pre-emption theory. In Gamer v. Teamsters 
Union5 the Court held that a state injunction could not duplicate 
a federal remedy by forbidding conduct proscribed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Diversity of procedures was said to be as 
apt to produce conflicting adjudications as diversity of substantive 
rules. It soon became apparent, however, that a majority of the Court 
regarded a deficiency in the federal remedy as a sufficient reason for 
sustaining state jurisdiction. Thus, employees or employers suffering 
monetary losses through tortious conduct that was also an unfair 
2. Chief Justice Wam:n himself authored eleven opinions in the approximately 
110 cues I surveyed: &ve dealt with pre-emption, His opinions included four diuents, 
three on this subject. The Chief Justice has consistently been one of the most pro-
pte-emption members of th-: Court. 
a. Rill v. Florida. 525 u.s. 558 (1945), 
4, UAW-Ari. v, WED {Briggs O' SIFa&ton CMj).], SS6 U.S. 24:5 (1949), For a more 
recent approach, sn Teamaten Local 20 v. Morton, 577 U.S. 252 (1964), 
5, 546 U.S. 485 (1955), 
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labor practice could maintain a state court action for damages, since 
the National Labor Relations Board had no general power to award 
full compensatory relief.6 At this juncture Chief Justice Warren 
stepped in to protest a state's awarding damages, especially punitive 
damages, for conduct regulated by the federal labor statutes. As he 
saw it, the uniformity of regulation by which Congress sought to 
secure nationwide industrial peace would be undermined by the 
numerous variations in state laws and the "provincialism" of local 
juries.' 
The Warren views did not entirely prevail, but their influence 
was plainly felt in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,8 
which remains the Court's most definitive statement on pre-emption. 
There the Court in handling the pre-emption issue shifted from an 
emphasis on the nature of the state relief sought (was it more ade-
quate than the federal remedy?) to an emphasis on the nature of 
the activity in question (was it regulated under federal law?). The 
now-famous test was enunciated that if conduct is "arguably'' pro-
tected by section 7 of the NLRA, or "arguably" prohibited by sec-
tion 8, exclusive primary jurisdiction rests in the NLRB and state 
(or federal) courts are precluded from acting. Earlier decisions which 
had appeared to rely on the deficiency of the federal remedy were 
explained as upholding state court jurisdiction because violence or 
threatened violence was present, or because the activity was of 
"merely peripheral concern" to the federal statutory scheme.8 
The soundness of all this surely is not self-evident. Under the 
expansive pre-emption doctrine, states have been sharply limited in 
the role they can play as "laboratories" for social experiment. 
Numerous restrictions have been imposed on customary state func-
tions. Thus, although the states can still assert their police power to 
maintain public order, they cannot take over a public utility to halt 
a. strike.10 Laws not dealing specifically with labor relations, such as 
state antitrust statutes11 and even traditional common-law libel doc-
trines,12 may also run afoul of the pre-emption principle. This is so 
6. United Constr. Work.en v. Labumum Comtr. Corp., !147 U.S. 656 (1954); UAW 
v. llllllell, 556 U.S. 684 (1958). 
7. UAW _v. llussell, 856 U.S. 634, 650-51 (1958) (dissenting opinion). 
8. !159 U.S. 256 (1959). 
9. !159 U.S. at 241-48, citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 
547 U.S. 656 (1954) (threatened violence); UAW v. Russell, 856 U.S. 684 (1958) (mass 
picketing); 1AM v. Gonzales, 856 U.S. 617 (1958) (wrongful expulsion of member from 
union). 
IO. Street, Elec. Ry. &: Motor Coach Employees Div. 1287 v. Missouri, !174 U.S. 74 
(1968). 
ll. Teamsten Local 24 v. Oliver, 858 U.S. 28!1 (1959). 
12. Cf. IJnn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, !18!1 U.S. 5!1 (1966) (libel action 
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even though it is by no means clear that Congress is as eager as the 
Supreme Court would suggest to ensure the unsullied uniformity 
of federal regulation.18 In extending the pre-emption doctrine, the 
Court nonetheless moved boldly ahead, willing to risk local losses to 
achieve national gains, and willing too, it would seem, to risk 
congressional displeasure for reading more into the statute than the 
legislature may have intended. 
On balance, I think the Court has acted wisely. Labor law con-
tinues to be one of our most divisive domestic issues, and much of 
the divisiveness runs along regional lines. Federally enforced uni-
formity thus seems peculiarly necessary, lest either unions or em-
ployers be unduly favored in particular states. Such regional varia• 
tions could hardly fail to have an adverse impact on the nation's 
economy. For example, plants might be lured from place to place 
while labor bitterness constantly deepened. The present healthy 
trend toward a leveling of wage rates for similar jobs across the 
country could well be reversed. Of course, a different result in 
almost any given Supreme Court pre-emption decision would doubt· 
less not have had dire consequences. But by now we probably have 
sufficient experience under the Court's broad pre-emption doctrine 
to conclude that vital local interests have in fact suffered no serious 
injury. This alone may be enough to indicate that the Court was 
right wp.en it began to tip the scales, as a matter of general policy, 
in favor of national interests rather than local concerns. 
The Warren Court's vigor in furthering the primacy of federal 
law was demonstrated even more strikingly in its rulings on the 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Labor contracts 
were traditionally enforced in accordance with state substantive law. 
It was often hard to sue a union in the state courts, however, because 
of the difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over an unincorporated 
association. Therefore, in 1947, Congress-wrote section 801 into the 
Taft-Hartley Act14 to provide that suits on contracts between unions 
and employers could be brought in the federal district courts. 
Unions were explicitly made competent to sue or be sued as entities. 
But what was the substantive law to be applied in 801 suits--
federal or state? If section 301 were to be treated as merely pro• 
cedural, with state substantive law applicable, the provision would 
maintainable only if defamation in course of labor dispute is malicious and actually 
injurious), 
IS. When Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 to provide the first 
comprehensive federal regulation of internal union affairs, it specifically negated any 
general intent to exclude concurrent state regulation. S•• 29 U.S,C, I 528 (1964). 
14. 29 u.s.c. I 185 (1964). 
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be of dubious constitutionality; article Ill of the Constitution con-
fines the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to cases involving 
diversity of citizenship or a federal question. Yet section 301 was 
silent on the question of applicable law, and Congress had furnished 
no clear guidance. 
After one earlier inconclusive skirmish,111 the Supreme Court 
came to grips with the problem in Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills.16 A union sued an employer in federal court for specific 
performance of the arbitration provisions in the parties' collective 
contract. Jurisdiction was contested. Justice Douglas, for the Court, 
cut the constitutional knot with one swift stroke, declaring that "the 
substantive law to apply in suits under§ 30l(a) is federal law which 
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."17 
Once this was established, jurisdiction could constitutionally be 
reposed in the federal judiciary. 
Perhaps the magnitude of the Court's undertaking in Lincoln 
Mills can best be gauged by attending to the highly literate criticism 
leveled at the decision in a classic article by Professors Alexander 
Bickel and Harry Wellington of the Yale Law School.18 The authors 
point out, quite correctly, that Justice Douglas' previously quoted 
conclusion, "which intrudes upon state power, which finds no sup-
port in the language of the statute and insignificant support in the 
legislative history, received no explanation in the opinion."19 But 
their ultimate objection to Lincoln Mills is far more profound. With 
an almost mystical concern for the institutional integrity of the 
judiciary, Bickel and Wellington argue that section 301, as read by 
the Supreme Court, demands of the federal courts a task to which 
they are "enormously unequal," and "its imposition on them is 
therefore capable of damaging their usefulness for the essential 
duties that they are suited to perform."20 The authors concluded that 
when Congress confers responsibilities upon the federal courts which 
are beyond their institutional capabilities, the proper disposition is 
a "remand" of the matter to Congress for further consideration. 
Remand is to be achieved through "any form of dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction which does no violence to the statutory Ianguage."21 
15. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
848 U.S. 487 (1955). 
16. 858 U.S. 448 (1957). 
17. 85!1 U.S. at 456. Justice Frankfurter dissented in a massively documented eighty-
aix-page opinion in which be sought to show that § 801 did not create substantive 
rights but was only procedural. !15!1 U.S. at 460. 
18. Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Rutv. 
L. R.Ev. 1 (1957). 
19. Id. at 85-86. 
20. Id. at 22-2!1. 
21. Id. at !15. 
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The task shouldered by the Supreme Court, despite the grave 
apprehensions of Bickel and Wellington, was the task of fashioning 
a body of federal contract law to govern the enforcement of collec-
tive agreements. Its sources were to be the policies of the federal 
labor statutes, state contract law where appropriate, arbitrators' deci-
sions, and so on. Bickel and Wellington looked at these "bits and 
pieces" and were aghast; the Court had faith that "judicial inventive-
ness" would find a way.22 Perhaps that is the difference between 
professors and practical men. By hindsight, at any rate, it is hard to 
find justification for the fears of the two perceptive Yale critics. 
Possibly an explanation for the easy survival of the federal judi-
ciary lies in the next maneuver executed by the Warren Court. 
Having boldly staked out a claim in Lincoln Mills to the whole of 
the labor contract domain, the Court then turned around in the 
Warrior trilogy28 and delegated to arbitrators the principal responsi-
bility for interpreting and applying collective bargaining agree-
ments. Courts are to order arbitration of grievances under a contract 
"unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute."2' Moreover, an arbitrator's award is to be enforced by a 
court without a review on the merits, so long as the award is not the 
product of fraud or capriciousness. Thus, through the Warrior ap-
proach, the Court may have finessed many of the problems envisaged 
by Bickel and Wellington. 
Even so, the Warren Court has managed to build up a fairly 
substantial body of basic contract doctrine. For instance, a labor 
agreement may be binding on a successor employer even though he 
has not signed it.211 Available grievance and arbitration machinery 
has to be exhausted before there can be resort to a court suit on a 
contract.28 And in the absence of a federal statute of limitations, 
state statutes apply to section 301 actions.27 These are the kinds of 
questions one might have anticipated the Court would have to 
resolve. They hardly seem a threat to its institutional capacities. 
Perhaps the most nettlesome current issue of labor contract en• 
forcement is the impact of the Norris-La Guardia Act. Here, more 
than anywhere else, the Supreme Court may be open to the charge 
22. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, !15!1 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
2!1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., !16!1 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel• 
workers v. Warrior 8c Gulf Nav. Co., !16!1 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel 8c Car Corp., !16!1 U.S. 59!1 (1960). 
24. United Steelworkers v. Warrior 8c Gulf Nav. Co., !16!1 U.S. 574, 582-85 (1960). 
25. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
26. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, Local 50, !170 U.S. 254 (1962); Republic 
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 579 U.S. 650 (1965). 
27. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., !185 U.S. 696 (1966). 
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that it failed to think through the implications of applying federal 
substantive law to suits brought under section 801. So far, the Court 
has held that the Norris-La Guardia injunction ban does not pre-
vent specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate,18 but that 
it does prevent an injunction by a federal court against a strike in 
breach of contract.21 Two embarrassing questions are left. Does 
Norris-La Guardia prevent a decree ordering specific performance of 
an arbitrator's award directing a union to halt a strike? And, does 
Norris-La Guardia apply to prevent a &tate court injunction against 
a strike in breach of contract?ao If the last question is answered 
"yes," that will be an ironic denouement to the Taft-Hartley Con-
gress' efforts to inC1'ea&e the range of employer remedies against 
unions. If the question is answered "no," the anomaly may be that 
state courts will become, by employer choice, the principal formu-
lators of federal law in this important area.81 These logical diffi-
culties could have been avoided if the Supreme Court had applied 
state substantive law in Lincoln Mills. The chances are, however, the 
Court would have come out the same way even if it had foreseen 
these problems. For the policy tug of having uniform federal law 
govern contract enforcement would have remained. And in a conflict 
between logic and policy, the Warren Court has never been prone 
to favor logic. 
Several other labor doctrines of the Warren Court mirror the 
libertarian philosophy that has permeated the Chief Justice's tenure. 
At least two should be mentioned-&ee speech and individual 
rights. 
After being in eclipse for almost a decade,82 the concept of peace-
ful picketing as a form of &ee speech protected by the first amend-
ment enjoyed a resurgence in the late years of the Warren Court. 
In one case the Court engaged in some rather strained statutory 
interpretation to reach the conclusion that the 1959 amendments to 
the Taft-Hartley Act do not forbid consumer picketing aimed at a 
particular nonunion product being distributed .by a neutral re-
tailer;88 otherwise, difficult constitutional questions might have been 
raised. In another case the Court held that a state court injunction 
28. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, !15!1 U.S. 448 (1957). 
29. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinaon, !170 U.S. 195 (1962). 
!IO. State COU1'tll retain Jurildic:tion to enforce collective apeementl, but they mlllt 
apply federal substandve law under I !IOI. Teamsten Local 174, v. Lucas Flour 
Co., !169 U.S. 95 (1962). 
!11. Union removal of I !IOI mitl from state to federal court may 101-.e tbll cJDemma. 
s., Aw» c.orp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 7H, !190 U.S. 557 (1968). 
82, S.., e.g., Teamsten Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 854 U.S. 284 (1957). 
!l!I. NL1lB Y. Fruit le Vegetable Pac:ten le Warehoulemen Local 7fO [Trs• Fruits], 
877 U.S. 58 (1964). 
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against the peaceful picketing of a business in a privately owned 
shopping center violated the first amendment. 84 The Court went on 
to say that ordinarily picketing can be forbidden only when it has 
an illegal end, and rejected the notion that the nonspeech aspects 
of picketing render the first amendment completely inapplicable. 
The Court also rewrote the legislative history of the union security 
-provisions of the Railway Labor Act for the purpose of avoiding 
first amendment issues. In two different cases the Court held that 
the Act prevented railroad unions from using dues money collected 
from employees under a union shop agreement for political pur-
poses, if the employees objected.811 
One of the most dramatic developments of the last half decade 
has been the rapid extension of employees' rights to fair representa-
tion in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining 
agreements. An individual employee now may sue his employer for 
breach of contract, and may join the union or sue it alone if it has 
treated him arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.86 An employee 
has no absolute right to have a grievance arbitrated,87 however, and 
he must first pursue any remedies available under the contract 
before he can file suit.88 Important questions in this area await the 
Court's future attention. Do honesty and conscientiousness excµse 
any union blunder? Do certain employee rights "vest" so as to be 
immune from further union-employer bargaining? To what extent 
may the courts intrude to protect individual rights without impair-
ing effective collective bargaining? This may well be the area in 
which the Warren Court has left the most unfinished business. 
In a celebrated little essay Sir Frederick Pollock remarked, "Cau-
tion and valour are both needed for the fruitful constructive inter-
pretation of legal principles."89 I suspect that others besides Profes-
sors Bickel and Wellington have doubts about the Warren Court on 
the score of caution. My own feeling, however, is that most of its 
forays are set off by retrenchments. States may not regulate conduct 
covered by the NLRA; but an exception is carved out for malicious 
and harmful libel. The courts shall assume responsibility for writing 
a body of federal contract law; but the day-to-day task is delegated 
to the arbitrators. Is that not "caution" as well as "valour"? In any 
event, if I must choose between the two in a field like labor law, the 
choice is plain. 
54. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 891 U.S. SOS (1968), 
55. 1AM v. Street, 567 U.S. 740 (1961); Brotherhood of 'R.y. le S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 575 
U.S. HS (1965). 
56. Humphrey v. Moore, 575 U.S. 355 (1964); Vaca v. Sipes, 586 U.S. 171 (1967). 
57. Vaca v. Sipes, 586 U.S. 171 (1967). 
58. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 579 U.S. 650 (1965), 
59. Judicial Caution and Valou7', in J1WSPRVDENCB IN ACTION 567, 575 (1955). 
